EU2'S REGIONAL ECONOMIC RECOVERY SOLUTIONS UNDER THE GLOBAL CRISIS by Ionescu Romeo
1. Introduction
The paper is focused on the tutorial of the measures implemented by the latest two 
Member States in order to save their national economies from the global financial crisis. 
Moreover, the analysis offers  a  better  understanding of the  complex  relationship  between 
policy and economy across the national states.
The time period of the analysis is 2007-2010 and it covers laws, ordinances, decrees 
and economic plans adopted by the governmental teams and the specialists from Romania and 
Bulgaria.
The impact of the global crisis on the EU member states has to be connected to the 
European integration process, which is based on a dualist system. This dualist system allows 
EU members a wide discretion to interpret and enforce the EU regulations. Moreover, the 
European integration is divided into the Euro area and other member states.
At the beginning, some EU countries considered the global crisis as a pure American 
phenomenon. This opinion  was  changed  when the  EU  faced to the decline in economic 
activity. 
But  things get  worse  and  the  global  trade  dropped  drastically.  As a  result,  the 
European exports decreased and the European industries faced to a significant contraction.
Some European governments spent high public resources in order to save the banks 
from  bankruptcy, to protect depositors, to unfreeze the  credit  markets and  to support the 
economic  growth.  These  measures  had  modest  results  and  the  economic  recession  and 
financial crisis became significantly. They forced the European governments to create quick 
political answers.
The  European  governments  worked  independent  and together,  in  order  to stop the 
significant decrease of the real and financial profits.
At  the  beginning,  the  crisis  hit  differently  the  EU  member  states;  the  greatest 
contractions were in Ireland, the Baltic Countries, Hungary and Germany. These contractions 
were above -4% in 2009. Bulgaria, Poland, Cyprus and Malta were less affected by the global 
crisis in the same year [1].
The dimension of the crisis impact on the EU member states depends on their initial 
economic  environment  and  its v ulnerabilities.  These  can  be divided  into  three  specific 
categories. First is that the property market and construction were oversized. During the latest 
decade, significant increases in the house prices were in UK, France, Ireland, Spain and Baltic 
countries and  they  were connected  to an optimistic point  of view about the  construction sector. On the other hand, some EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe were
particularly hard hit by this way to attract revenues to the public budget.
The second  category  is connected to  the  economy  dependence on  exports  and the 
current budget position. Those countries which had a powerful export demand and/or had 
current budgetary surplus were highly exposed to the world trade contraction. On the other 
hand, other countries which had high budgetary deficits faced to a flooding capital flows risk. 
Some Central and Eastern European member states can be included into the last category. 
Sometimes, the sudden stop  of the foreign  financing  forces  the  governments  to  ask  for 
technical assistance connected to the cash flow from the EU, IMF and World Bank.
Third, the analysis has to quantify the financial sector dimension and/or its exposure to 
risky assets. Some member states (UK, Ireland and Luxembourg) have important financial 
centres and are exposed to the financial turmoil. On the other hand, the member states which 
have trans-border banking centres inside the emergent Central and Eastern Europe are likely 
to be strongly  affected.  The  risks  for  the  European  banks on the emergent  markets are 
concentrated especially in Austria, Belgium and Sweden (the last is exposed to the Baltic 
economies).
Practically, the present crisis is able to activate the adjusting of the current budgetary 
imbalances across the EU even that is too early to have relevant conclusions. 
2. Government measures for economic recovery in Romania
Romania adhered to the EU in 2007. It has the rank 11 as GDP and the rank 8 as 
purchasing power. At the beginning, Romania considered that its adhering to the EU will 
guarantee the social, national and economic security of the population. 
The  problem  is that  Romania’s adhering  to  the  EU  was  more a political than  an 
economic decision. As a result, the social crisis in Romania is generated by the obligation 
assumed by the government to achieve the macroeconomic criteria assumed to Brussels [2].
According to Maastricht criteria, the budgetary deficit of a member state has to be less 
than 3% of GDP. But Romania’s deficit was -8.6% in 2009 and -7.4% in 2010. Moreover, the 
European Commission forecast talks about deficits of -4.9% in 2011 and -3.5% in 2012 [3].
Moreover, the GDP growth rate in Romania was negative during 2009-2010 (-7.1% 









Figure 1: GDP growth rate and government balance in Romania (%)
Source: personal contribution using Eurostat database
The Romanian government motivated that it tries to avoid the same situation as in 
Greece. As a result, it signed a stand-by agreement (19.8 billion Euros) with the IMF, the 
World  Bank  and  ERDB  on March 2009.  In  order  to  receive  this  loan,  Romania  has  to 
decrease  its budgetary deficit to 2.5% until  2013.  This condition  was the signal for the 
Romanian government to start a pain recovery program.
The anti-crisis program in Romania had two important steps: the recovery program 
from 2009 and the dedicated program from 2010.
The 2009 recovery program was focused on anti-cyclical measures which to be able to 
avoid installed already precarious situation escalation. The national implemented anti-crisis 
steps had to be correlated to those adopted by the EU, in order to maximise their positive 
effects. 
The economic convergence inside the EU had to be continued, including the adhering 
to the Euro  area.  The short term  actions  were  incorporated  into  average  and  long  term 
strategies. The inhabitants’ economic interest (purchasing power, ability to return loans, job 
availability) and the social security had to be protected. Romania had to remain attractive to 
the FDI during the crisis period. The steps to tackle crisis had to do in a logical order; a made 
step had to generate or to support the future actions. All these measures and principles were 
included into 2009 Budget Law. Moreover, the government forecasted a GDP growth rate of 
2.5%, a budgetary deficit of -2% and an inflation rate of 5% in 2009. In the same year, the 
Romania’s GDP was forecasted to 144.7 billion Euros and the budget to 51 billion Euros 
(35% of GDP) [4].
In order to achieve these optimistic results, the Romanian government implemented 
drastic  measures to  limit  the budgetary  expenditures:  it blocked  the employments  in the 
budgetary system, adopted special measures connected to the “luxury” employees from the 
public  system  and  their  participation  in  the  administrative  councils  which  offered  them important financial benefits. In 2009, the overtime working was not paid; it was compensated 
by time off. The government was focused on a decrease of staff costs of about 20% aimed at 
saving jobs than redundancies. The theoretical support for these measures was the idea that 
the additional revenues in the public sector were greater than the individual wages.
The  Romanian  government  adopted  regulations  in order to support the  economic 
growth and to limit the crisis’ effects. These were divided into economic and social measures. 
The economic measures were the following: 
 allocating a percentage of 20% (about 10 billion Euros) from the 2009 budget for 
investment in infrastructure (transport, environment, health, education), in order to generate 
jobs and savings, keeping jobs and new opportunities to pay the social obligations;
 accumulated government debt payment, respecting those due;
 growing the European Funds’ absorption using the commitments coordination and the 
progresses monitoring and the implementation of a inter-ministerial committee leaded by the 
Prime Minister;
 tax exemptions for reinvested profit since 2010;
 compensation for the VAT to be recovered to VAT to be paid to the budget, in order 
to eliminate jam, bureaucracy and wasted time in the system;
 CEC AND Exim  Bank’s privatization. CEC’s privatization had to bring about 250 
million Euros, as a capital infusion for the Romanian economy;
 setting up a credit guarantee fund for SMEs;
 using the same funds as in 2008, in order to promote the exports and to grow the 
public financing of the exports;
 enlargement of the “Jalopy” program, which covered the recycling of 60000 old cars, 
sponsored by a financial bonus of 950 Euros;
 incorporation of the individual incomes of the institutions and governmental agencies 
into the general consolidated budget;
 higher  taxation  for  the  luxury  goods  and taxation  of gabling, in order to collect 
supplementary financial resources to the public budget.
On the other hand, the social measures were the following:
 establishing  a  minimum  pension  of  87  Euros,  which  had  to  be  paid  into  two 
instalments to those peoples which had a low level of their pensions;
 compensation by 90% in the price of medicines for those retired which had incomes 
less than 150 Euros; during the first three months of technical unemployment, no tax had to be paid to the 
public budget and the state social security budget;
 covering  50%  of  the  continuous  professional  training  for  the  employees  and  the 
employers;
 growing the pensions and the wages according to the inflation rate.
The Romanian government considered that Romania fitted the European economic 
recovery plan, including its social component. 
The reality was different of the optimistically vision of the Romanian government, at 












Figure 2: Disparities between economic indicators (government plan vs. reality) in 
Romania (%)
Source: personal contribution using Eurostat database
In order to accelerate the economic recovery, the Romanian government implemented 
a new anti-crisis program on June 2010. The main elements of this new programme are:
 the gross earning of the public sector employees was reduced by 25%;
 the pension point value decreased to 150 Euros. The guaranteed minimum level of 
social pension decreased from 350 lei to 300 lei;
 the veterans, heroes and those persecuted from political reasons’ incomes decreased 
by 15%. This decreased was applied to the allowances and bonuses disabled, veterans and war 
widows, to the rights to persons persecuted for political reasons and to displaced persons, as 
well;
 the persons  which had performed  military service under the General  Direction of 
Labour Service during 1950-1961, heroes of 1989 revolution and those from 1987 received 
lower pensions;
 the retired from the diplomatic and consular activities, the magistrates, the auxiliary of 
the courts and court prosecutions, the civil aviation personnel, the deputies and the senators and  the  former  employees of  the  Court of  Auditors  received new  pensions,  taxed  at 90 
percent;
 the unemployment benefit decreased by 15%. The same decrease affected the pensions 
of the military and civilian personnel from the Ministry of National Defence;
 the  decrease  of  15%  affected  the  children’s  allowances,  the  maternity  baby,  the 
complementary  family  allowance, the support  for single-parent  family  allowance and the 
offered allowances to increase child;
 the decrease of 15% affected the disability aids and the attendant pay indemnities for 
adults with severe visual disabilities;
 the marriage first aid (200 Euros) was cut out;
 the bank deposits interest was taxed by 16%;
 the student scholarships decreased by 25%;
 free transportation via public transportation;
 additional  tax  for  the second house  (33%),  for  the third house  (50%)  and more 
(100%).
All  these  above  measures  deepened the  recession  in  Romania  in 2 010  and  at the 
beginning of 2011.
The VAT increases putted the economy in infusions, because it affected the demand 
and grew the prices. The government didn’t received more money to the budget (10.3% more 













Figure 3: VAT collections trend in Romania (million lei)
Source: [5]
The Romanian government is not able to increase the VAT, because its actual level is 
one of the greater in the world.On the other hand, the government modified 11 times the Tax Code in 2010. Still 1
stof 
January 2011, the excise taxes on fuel and cigarettes grew by 3%, for example. As a result, 
the predictability became a simple notion of dictionary. These changes affected the fiscal 
stability and, as a result, the competitiveness. Moreover, the excise taxes’ growth supported 










Figure 4: Revenues from excisein Romania (million lei)
Source: [6]
Another controversial was the minimum tax, which was implemented at 1
st of May 
2009. This tax supported the bankruptcy of more than 100000 companies. These companies 












Figure 5: Budgetary revenues in Romania (billion lei)
Source: personalcontribution using the Ministry of Public Finance’s database
A real challenge for the Romanian economy is its low EU funds’ absorption capacity. 
According to the official reports, the Romania’s absorption capacity was less than 10% during 
2007-2010. Romania may obtain 30 billion Euros from the EU funds until 2013. The problem is that Romania was able to attract only 0.6 billion Euros in 2009 and 1.7 billion Euros in 
2010 from the EU funds [7].
According to  this  figure,  the  worst  results  had  the Ministry of Transports,  which 
attracted only 1.03% from the EU Transports funds for Romania (TR). The best results had 
the Regional Operational Program (ROP) which used 14.89% from the dedicated EU fund.
The  Human  Resources  Development  (HRD)  covered  13.36% of the payments, the 
Economic Competitiveness Growth (ECG) 9.83%, the Environment Program (ENV) 7.06%, 
the Technical Assistance (TA) 5.27% and the Administrative Capacity Development (ACD) 
only 4.9%.









Figure 6: EU funds in Romania in 2010 (%)
Source: personalcontribution using the Authority for Structural Instruments’ database
Maybe the most unpopular measure implemented by the Romanian government was 
the wages decrease, which cut practically the consumption. This process was followed by a 













Figure 7: Personnel costs inRomania (million lei)
Source: personalcontribution using the Ministry of Public Finance’s databaseBut  the greatest  mistake of  the  Romanian  government’s  policy  in 2 010  was that 
connected to the investment. The government tried to implement the idea that it inaugurated 
few kilometres of highway and portions of the belt roads. The remaining money was spent on 
landscape design, border changes and asphalt on side streets. These investments covered 4.4% 
of GDP in the first 10 months from 2010. The problem was that the budgetary expenditures













Figure 8: Budget expenditures inRomania (billion lei)
Source: personalcontribution using the Ministry of Public Finance’s database
The  First  House  program  bundled  the  trade,  not  the  investments.  This  program 
supported the selling of old houses and didn’t produce VAT. In 2011, this program offers 10-
15000 Euros guarantee higher for those who build or buy new houses.
On the other hand, the arrears level grew in 2010, because the government didn’t paid 
its bills,  in  order  to  respect  the  budget  deficit  targets  fixed  by  IMF.  As a  result,  the 
government debts cover 12 billion lei (10 billion lei arrears of the public companies). IMF 
asked Romanian government to decrease to zero the arrears level in 2011.
Still 2010, the exports became the rope for the Romanian economy. The exports grew 
by 26.7% in 2010 regarding 2009. The greatest exports were covered by Dacia cars made in 
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Figure 9: Romania’s foreign trade growth rate (%)
Source: personalcontribution using the EU data bases
Beyond the implemented measures, the business environment requires the absence of a 
coherent  message  from  the  government.  The  government  micromanagement  and  the 
hazardous forecasts support the general climate of distrust in Romania.
3. Government measures for economic recovery in Bulgaria
Bulgaria adhered to the EU in the same year with Romania, as a free market economy. 
During the communist regime, Bulgaria was powerfully connected to the Soviet market. As a 
result, the crash of the Soviet Union caused the welfare decrease by 40% in Bulgaria [9]. Still 
2004, the economic growth started to achieve the same rates as in the communist period.
During 2002-2008, the FDI and the domestic demand supported an annual average 
GDP growth rate of 6%. But the Bulgarian economy entered under recession, as a result of the 
export  demand  contraction  and  FDI  decrease.  During  the  present  crisis,  the  Bulgarian 
government was loyal to the financial stability, decreasing the budgetary expenditures and 
creating favourable conditions to the business environment and FDI. But Bulgaria was not 
able to face the crisis without EU financial support.
The GDP growth rates decreased during 2008-2010, but the European Commission 
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Figure 10: Bulgaria’s GDP growth rate (%)
Source: personalcontribution using the EU data bases
           The Bulgarian government's attitude was proactive in its efforts to face to the financial 
crisis. The direct influence of the crisis on the Bulgarian bank sector was limited and it didn’t 
ask for the government support intervention measures.
However,  the  government  implemented  measures  to  support  the  economy,  the 
decrease the  expenditures and the  revenues  increase.  The  Bulgarian  economy  recovery  is 
connected to the neighbours’’  recovery. Moreover,  Bulgaria has to change its  economic 
growth model based on exports to another able to promote the sustainable development [11].
The  prime-minister  Boiko  Borissov  and  its  government  implemented  a  recovery 
package with 48 measures. Some measures are focused on: “luxury tax” on yachts, on cars 
with engine displacement  capacity greater  than  1500  cm
3  and on  interests  for those bank 
deposits of more than 100 000 leva.
There would be no change to the flat tax system or to social insurance contributions. 
Other measures being put forward included the issue of a bond loan and a cap on the pay of 
public sector employees.
Further, it was proposed to privatise unwanted state property and to allow the Silver 
Fund, a mechanism set up some years ago to stabilise resources for pension funds, to invest in 
low-risk domestic financial instruments.
No tax was imposed on pensions, only working pensioners paid welfare contributions 
on their income. 
The implementing all proposed measures allowed the Government to keep the status 
quo by the end of 2011, the point at which, official projections say, Bulgaria will emerge from 
the economic crisis.
The  National  Council  for  Tripartite Cooperation,  formed  by  the  government 
representatives, unions and employers’ organisations established 60+1 anti-crisis measures connected to:  fiscal  support,  public  expenditures decrease,  financial  discipline,  additional 
financial resources for companies, households’ incomes support, labour market and social 
security and health system.
The fiscal support measures were focused on the following: 
 introduction of a final tax on the goods and cash prizes from gambling;
 changing the method of taxation of insurance premiums;
 changing to 1.1 (from 1.0) the coefficient used in the pre-payment tax calculation for 
2010 „CITAct” program;
 introduction the “luxury tax”.
Other measures were focused on the financial discipline:
 recovery of VAT duty owed by companies in the legal time limit;
 establishment  of  public  records  for  the  procurement  funds,  VAT,  excises  and 
European projects;
 immediate legislative review in order to guarantee the repayment period in the name 
of  the public  companies  as a period without  calculating  interest  on  taxes  and  insurance 
contributions. Moreover, the access will be easily to the European projects and procurement;
 simplified procedures and shortened time limits for the bankruptcy process.
The  Ministry  of  Finance  has  to  publish  monthly  detailed information  about:  the 
execution sections of the budget revenues  and  expenditures,  including  VAT  balance; the 
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Figure 11: Bulgaria’s foreign debt (billion USD)
Source: personalcontribution using the EU data bases
Every quarter, the Ministry of Finance  collects  and publish  information  about the 
financial results of all public companies.  Connected  to  the  labour  market,  the  National  Agency  for  Fiscal  Administration 
collects  information  about  unpaid  wages  and  offers  resumes  with  quarterly  dates  about 
national  and  regional  economy.  The  labour  structure  in  2010  was:  agriculture  – 7.5%, 




Figure 12: Bulgaria’s labour structure (%)
Source: personalcontribution using [13]
Other measures were connected to the Social and Health Insurance System:
 temporary suspension of the reducing social security contributions until the end of 
2011;
 give up health insurance  contribution  increase;  introduction of  electronic  cards  for 
each patient until the end of 2011; drastic control measures connected to the budget of the 
National Health Insurance Fund;
 people  without health  insurance  or  without  other  incomes  will  pay the  insurance 
contribution calculated according to their income from equity and property.
The 60+1 measure is theprohibition in cash payments over a certain limit.
4. Comparative analysis: Bulgaria and Romania versus the crisis
In 2009, Romania’s GDP decreased by 7.1% and the budgetary deficit was 7.2%. On 
March  2010,  the  Romanian prime-minister declared that  government's economic  austerity 
plans have to be respected strictly “if we don’t want to go to Greece”.
Similar warnings came from Sofia. Bulgaria had a budgetary surplus when the global 
crisis got the national economy. This is why Bulgaria finished the 2009 fiscal year with a 
deficit  less than  1% and it had not to  lend  from  IMF,  as  Romania.  On the other hand, 
Bulgaria’s GDP decreased by 4.9% in 2009. 
The European Commission forecasts talk about different performances of these two 
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Figure 13: Bulgaria and Romania GDP trend (%)
Source: personalcontribution using the EU data bases
Both countries have a similar evolution connected to the inflation rate, which will be 
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Figure 14: Bulgaria and Romania inflation rate trend (%)
Source: personalcontribution using the EU data bases
Moreover, both countries want to adhere to the Euro area in the next 5 years. Like 
their fellow Romanians, Bulgarians leaders are eager to keep the single system of taxation, as 
a stimulus for the economic activity.
The public protests and the negotiations with trade unions forced both governments to 
adopt  different  positions.  As a  result,  there  are  differences  connected  to  the  economic 
environment in Bulgaria and Romania (see table 1).
Table 1: The economic environment in Bulgaria and Romania
Domain Romania Bulgaria
Profit tax 16% 10%
Income tax 16% 10%
Dividends tax 16% 5%
Wages tax 62% 34%
Tax returns Quarterly QuarterlyProfit tax payment Quarterly Annual 
Filing VAT declarations Monthly/ Quarterly Monthly
VAT recovery Uncertain 45 days of the request
Exchange rate Jumpy 4.2 lei/Euro Fixedly 1.95 leva/Euro
VAT rate Broad 24% Broad 20%
Tour packages 9% Tour packages 9%
Export 0% Export 0%
Minimum capital About 46.5 Euros About 1 Euro
Net minimum wage About 139.5 Euros About 123.7 Euros
Source: DPA
Bulgaria has a better business environment connected to tax and minimum capital. 
Moreover, the leva exchange rate is fixed and lower than that of the Romanian currency. 
But both countries faced to budget cuts in education, health and public administration. 
These measures are asked by the IMF (for Romania), the EU, in order to adhere to the Euro 
area and by the anti-crisis plans financed by the EU in Greece and Ireland.
On the other hand, both countries face to a new challenge: the general government 
gross debt increase during 2007-2010. The EU forecasts about this indicator talk about new 
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Figure 15: Bulgaria and Romania general government gross debt (%  of GDP)
Source: personalcontribution using the EU data bases
5. ConclusionsThe first question connected to this analysis is if the above economic measures in 
Bulgaria and Romania are timely. The Bulgarian and Romanian economists are sceptically 
about the budget cuts and the means to fight against crisis.
A better solution is focusing on the key industry areas with high economic importance 
and a greater influence on other industries, welfare and social inequality.
Across the EU27 the present global crisis affected powerfully the EU2 countries, even 
that Greece and Ireland are the” stars” of the recession. 
The speculative behaviour of the global investors focused the EU2 states on the area of 
financial  regulation,  a critical  area  to  create a sustainable  and  efficient  financial system. 
During 2007-2010, Bulgaria and Romania had to demonstrate their ability to face the crisis 
and to save their economies from the national bankruptcy [14].
Both countries were hit by the economic recession and bank crisis and they had to face 
to the GDP, imports and exports’ decreases, social deficiencies and concerns connected to the 
adhering to the Euro area.
Making everything worse, the popular pressure on policymakers grew by numerous 
street protests and strikes. The people's dissatisfaction was supported by the inability of the 
leaders to explain the situation.
Both governments created and implemented anti-crisis plans, in order to achieve the 
economic recovery and to decrease the public expenditures.
Even that the specialists’ forecasts were optimistically, the political passivity and the 
bureaucratic instability affected the results. 
Moreover, the  internal tensions between  power  and opposition parties  were putted 
across some motions of censure which decreased the confidence both states look for the FDI.
The  only  solution  would  be  a  drastic  reform  of  the  economic,  financial  and 
administrative systems, greater involvement of the state in decisions related to the banking 
sector and a better financial education for the citizens. 
Even  is t oo  late  now,  both  states  hope  to  a better  future.  The  above  analysis 
demonstrated that both countries had the same political and economic past, have the same 
present and will have the same future, as well.
The successfully recovery of Romania and Bulgaria represents a high stakes not only 
for the EU2, but for the EU27’s future.
References[1]  European  Commission,  Economic  Crisis  in  Europe:  Causes,  Consequences  and 
Responses, Luxembourg, 2009, pp.1-5.
[2] Negrescu  Adrian,  The  10  government  measures  which  have  deepened  the  crisis  in 
Romania, in Daily Business, 29.12.2010, p.1.
[3] European Commission, European Economic Forecast Autumn 2010, no. 7/2010, Brussels, 
p.133.
[4] Stoica Emil, The Government's Crisis Boc program: a step forward, in Cotidianul, 24 
ianuarie 2009, pp.1-2.
[5] www.businessday.ro
[6]  Ministry  of  Public  Finance,  General  Government  Budget  Execution  during  1.01.-
31.12.2010, Bucharest, 2011.
[7] Batca Ana, Romania headway in attracting European funds, in evz.ro, 27.01.2011.
[8] National Institute of Statistics, International Trade Statistic, no. 10/2010, Bucharest, pp.5-
6.
[9] http://www.docstoc.com/docs/6067415/Economy_of_Bulgaria
[10]  European  Commission,  European  Economic  Forecast  Autumn  2010,  no.  7/2010, 
Brussels, p.69.
[11] http://jsis.washington.edu/euc//file/2010%20MEU/Bulgaria_Finance_Position_Paper.pdf
[12] Leviev-Sawyer Clive, Bulgarian Government’s 48 proposed anti-crisis measures, in The 
Echo, 22.03.2010.
[13] www.economy.watch.com
[14] Ionescu Romeo, European Business Environment, Ed. Galati University Press, 2010.